They are also the most important depositories of public saving and most important disburses of finance. Commercial banking in India is a unique system, the like of which exists nowhere in the world. The truth of this statement becomes clear as one studies the philosophy and approaches that have contributed to the evolution of the banking policy, program and operations in India 1 · report submitted in 1954 the all India rural credit survey committee recommended the creation of one strong integrated, state sponsored, state partnered commercial banking institution with effective machinery of branches spread over the whole country. In pursuance of its recommendations, the imperial bank was nationalized and renamed as state bank of India from July 1, 1955 . Nationalization of the Imperial bank of India heralded the entry of public sector into commercial banking 5 · To further strengthen the public sector banking structufe, eight state associated banks were taken over by the state bank of India as 4 ·its subsidiaries with the passing of the state bank of (subsidiary banks) act, 1959 6 · However, despite the widespread development of the banking system, the Indian financial system was characterized by lack of depth at the time of independence. Organized credit institutions had a negligible presence in rural India.
The entire process of institution building in the post-independence period revolved around the country's need to mobilize savings in order to raise the investment rate and to channel resources to identified sectors of the economy, notably agriculture and industry. The objective of economic development had assumed a sense of urgency in the 1950s with the launching of the five-year Plans. At the beginning of planning in 1951, the Indian economy operated at relatively low levels of saving and investment.
The Plan observed that the desirable rate of growth in output could be achieved only if investment could be stepped up substantially. The planning strategy was based on the concept of a mixed economy where, both public and private sectors had a role to play with regard to investment activity and in mobilization of resources. The First five-year Plan stated: "Central banking in a planned economy can hardly be confined to the regulation of the overall supply of credit or to a somewhat negative regulation of the flow of bank credit. It would have to take on a direct active role, firstly, in creating or helping to create the machinery needed for financing developmental 1 activities all over the country and secondly, ensuring that the finance available flows in the directions intended" 7 . Though Indian banking system made considerable progress both functionally and in terms of geographical coverage after independence but some serious gaps existed in the banking development during this period. In order to bring about far reaching changes in the concept and working of banks in the country, the scheme of social control over commercial banks was introduced in 1967 8 . The basic objective of the social control policy was to ensure, in the immediate future an equitable and purposeful distribution of credit within the resources available keeping in view of the developmental needs.
Nevertheless, the government felt that the social control experiment was basically inadequate to achieve the social goals and objectives 9 . Thus, the experience during this period suggested that institution building and development of the financial system be propelled by the vision of the country's central planners after Independence. The vision was to ensure that sectoral needs of credit to agriculture and industry were met in an organized manner. The RBI was vested with the major responsibility of developing the institutional infrastructure in the financial system. The commercial banking system was expanded to take care of the general banking needs of accepting deposits and extending short-term working capital to industry. In order to accelerate the pace of extension of banking facilities in the country and to provide a greater response to the credit needs of the cooperative sector, the biggest commercial bank, State Bank of India was brought under the majority ownership of the RBI.
To cater to the long-term financing needs of industry at the national level, and in the absence of a well-developed capital market, Development Finance Institutions (DFis) were established under the majority ownership of the RBI.
The RBI also set up a mechanism to provide concessional finance to these institutions. State Finance Corporations (SFCs) were also set up to cater to long-term needs of industry at the State level. The financing needs of the rural agriculture sector were sought to be fulfilled by a three-tier cooperative banking structure, which was complemented by Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs) at the urban sector level. The accelerated pace of public investment and industrialization during the end of 1950s and the early · 1960s created conditions for stepping up private investment in industry. The Unit Trust of India (UTI) came into existence in 1964 also initially sponsored by RBI to provide a channel for retail investors for participating in the capital market.
Recognizing that exports did not receive much attention from the country's planners in the early years, an Export Risk Insurance Corporation was set up in July 1957, which was later converted into the Export Credit and Guarantee 
BANKING IN POST NATIONALISATION PERIOD (FROM 1969 TO 1990)
Even though the Indian banking system made considerable progress both functionally and in terms of geographical coverage during the above period, there were still many rural and semi-urban areas, which were not served by banks. Moreover, large industries and big and established houses tended to enjoy a major portion of the credit facilities, to the detriment of the priority sectors such as agriculture, small-scale industries and exports. Thus, to bring about a wider diffusion of banking facilities and changes in the pattern of bank lending, the Government initiated the scheme of social control over banks that envisaged organizational and legislative changes. The systems of credit planning which identified priorities for loans and advances and the Lead Bank Scheme that sought to make the banking system a vehicle of development were used as instruments of social control over banks. Regarding the working of commercial banks during the period of social control over banks, the then Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi observed that "in many banks people who had been controlling their policies in the past continued to exercise their influence over them in one way or other, sometimes by the continued presence of the old chairmen or vice chairmen on the boards. The banks might, as some did, obey the instructions and directions given to them. But there is all difference in the world between people who carry out a policy wholeheartedly and with enthusiasm and those who do so only because of certain instructions. And even these directions were not followed by many of the banks and we cannot continue to ignore the impatience and frustration with which the underprivileged look at our efforts to help them stand on their own feet" 11 .This transitory phase was followed by the nationalization of banks.
In July 1969, 14 largest commercial banks were nationalized as a major step to ensure adequate credit flow into genuine productive areas in conformity with Plan priorities. Bank nationalization served to intensify the social objective of ensuring that financial intermediaries fully met the credit demands for productive purposes. Two significant aspects of nationalization were (i) rapid branch expansion; and (ii) channeling of credit according to Plan priorities. To meet these broad objectives, banking facilities were made available in hitherto uncovered areas, so as to enable them to mop up potential savings and meet the credit gaps in agriculture and small-scale industries, thereby helping to bring large areas of economic activities within the organized banking system.
As a consequence, the perceived need of the borrower gained primacy over commercial considerations in the banking sector. The sole objective of bank nationalization in 1969 was to rectify the Socio-economic malaise that resulted from the localized, urban biased, and profit oriented development of the privately owned banking sector over the years.
The continuation of wide disparities in the development pattern of states, regions, and sectors, the widening poverty gap, growing unemployment and the enlarging economic disparities were to a large extent traceable to the pattern of banking facilities that existed so far. It was felt that banks as important financial intermediaries and with stupendous investment capacity should act in such a way_ that they could make a significant impact of reducing the disparities increasing employment and on mitigating the problem of poverty.
In April 1980, six more private sector banks were nationalized, thus extending the domain of public control over the banking system.
By the middle of the 1970s, it was felt that the task of providing agricultural credit on the requisite scale could not·be met by commercial banks, unless they acquired specialized knowledge of the rural setting. Against this background, Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) were set up in 1975 to fill this gap in financing . Consequently, by the end of 1975, three separate institutional arrangements -commercial banks, cooperative banks and RRBs -known as the multi-agency approach for providing credit in the rural areas emerged. In order to check the effects of such large-scale monetisation, the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) was frequently increased to control liquidity. The money market, which was intended as a market for equilibrating the demand and supply of funds in the inter-bank market, was narrow and relatively illiquid with control on interest rates. It was only in the late 1980s that the interest rate in the inter-bank call money market was deregulated and new instruments like the Commercial Paper and Certificates of Deposit were introduced to make the market more liquid.
The dominance of the public sector and state ownership persisted during the 1980s. The financial system was shaped and architectured to meet the objectives of the Government enunciated through the Plans. Hence, both the liabilities and asset sides of the balance sheets of the financial institutions were controlled . The authorities believed that the main objectives of these institutions were to mobilize savings at low cost and deploy them into identified priority sectors at subsidized rates. Markets did not exist in the true sense. Capital markets were controlled and hence transaction costs were high. The government securities market was just a captive market for raising debt for the Government and the money market was restricted to the inter-bank call money market where interest rates were controlled for most part of the 1980s. Such control resulted in several inefficiencies creeping into the banking system. Repression assumed the form of a high and administered interest rate structure with a large measure of built-in cross-subsidization (in the form of minimum lending rates for commercial sector), high levels of preemption through primary and secondary reserve requirements, in the form of CRR and SLR.
MOVE TOWARDS PROCESS OF REFORMS
On the eve of the reforms in 1991, the SLR and CRR together pre-empted as much as 63 .5 per cent of the banks' deployable resources. Retail lending to riskier areas of business with the 'free' portion of banks' resources engendered 'adverse selection' of borrowers. With limited prospects of recovery, this raised costs and affected the quality of bank assets.
Quantitative restrictions (branch licensing and restrictions on new lines of business) and inflexible management structures severely constrained the operational independence and functional autonomy of banks. Inflationary expectations and the inequitable tax structures exacerbated the strains on the exchequer, since resources for developmental purposes were not readily forthcoming . As the quality of asset portfolio of banks rapidly deteriorated, it was evident that the profitability of the banking system was severely compromised. In addition, the widespread market segmentation and the constraints on competition exacerbated the already fragile situation. The market for short-term funds was reserved for banks and the market for long-term funds was the exclusive domain of DFis. Direct access of corporate borrowers to lenders (disinter mediation) was strictly controlled and non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) were allowed to collect fund only for corporate.
The balance of payments crisis, which followed in the wake of the Gulf War of 1990, as also the erosion of public savings and the inability of the public sector to generate resources for investment, rapidly brought forth the imperatives for financial sector strengthening in India. Accordingly Govt. of India decided to initiate process of financial sector reforms.
The Indian approach to financial sector reforms is based on 'pancha sutra' or five principles -cautious and proper sequencing; mutually reinforcing measures; complementarily between reforms in the banking sector and changes in ·fiscal, external and monetary policies; developing financial infrastructure; and developing financial markets.
The reforms were introduced in June 1991 in the wake of a balance of payments crisis, which was certainly severe. It was not a prolonged crisis; on the contrary, it erupted suddenly at the end of a period of healthy growth in the 1980s, when the Indian economy grew at an annual average rate of about 5.5 per cent. Although modest by recent international standards, this was much better than India's previous experience of 3-3.5 per cent growth. By the beginning of the 1980s, it began to be recognized that the central planning approach of inward oriented industrialization, that was reinforced by a complex system of economic controls and heavy dependence on the public sector could not deliver rapid growth in an increasingly competitive world environment. Several initiatives were undertaken in the second half of the 1980s to mitigate the rigorous of the control regime: direct tax rates were reduced, the role of the private sector was expanded and licensing controls on both trade and foreign investment were liberalized.
However, these changes were marginal rather than fundamental in nature, amounting more to loosening of controls and operation rather than their elimination . Since the economy was seen to have responded well to these initiatives, with the acceleration of growth in the 1980s, it created a strong presumption in favor of evolutionary change. branches in India 13 . These banks however, suffered from many shortcomings. Major among them was that they did not work for nation's interest and catered to the needs of few big industrial houses. Small-scale industries, agriculture and export sector were neglected by these banks.
To overcome these shortcomings the government nationalized 14 major banks in 1969 and 6 more banks in 1980. The reasons responsible for nationalization were mainly control of big business houses over major banks, discrimination among small borrowers, neglect of priority sector, urban biasness, huge profit motive, and financing to socially undesirable activities.
In the post-nationalization period, significant progress has been made in expanding the branch network of the banking system and in the growth of banking activities measured in terms of deposit, advances and other variables. Banks have been in the forefront of financial intermediation playing a supportive role in the country's development process.
SCHEDULED BANKING STRUCTURE IN INDIA
The structure of scheduled banks in India is divided in two groups; scheduled commercial banks and scheduled co-op banks. Flow chart given below depicts In the sphere of mobilization of the community's financial savings, the commercial banks have emerged as one of the major financial intermediaries in the country 16 . Since nationalization, there has been a spectacular rise in the volume of deposit of commercial banks in India. More impressive in the post nationalization period has been the growth in advances. Table 1 
NPAs IN PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS
The banks in their books have different kind of assets; such as cash in hand, balances with other banks, investments, loans and advances, fixed assets and other assets. Here the NPAs concept is restricted to loans and advances. As long as an asset generates income expected from it, it is treated as performing assets and when it fails to generate income, it becomes non-performing asset.
In other words, a loan asset becomes non-performing asset when it ceases to Indian banking adopted internationai standards of accounting since last ten years moving towards prudential regulations as against the structural regulation of yesteryears. Prudential norms were adopted with regard to: - The most crucial factor that governs the performance of banks is asset classification and the resultant non-performing assets identified. The high level of NPAs dampens the performance of the banks. NPAs is a doubleedged knife that tells on the banks profitability on the one hand, bank can not recognize/ book income (interest) on NPA accounts and on the other, it is a drain on the banks profitability due to funding costs. To add to the woes, profit earned has to be diverted towards making loan loss provisions as per IRAC norms. 
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
It is assumed that growth in NPAs could be checked considerably if bank and financial institutions have suitable internal arrangements. These arrangements are related to internal systems, procedures and practices for monitoring of NPAs and recovery of the same. So, in order to make the present study, more scientific and systematic the researcher had framed the following objectives:
• To analyze the financial statements of PSBs for estimating the NPAs. 
HYPOTHESES
In order to make present study more accurate and to make the findings generalized, the researcher tested following null hypotheses.
Ho--6.1 By and large there is no significant difference in the opinion of branch managers, credit/ loan officers at regional/ zonal offices and the bank consultants regarding effectiveness of factors responsible for making a loan non-performing.
Ho-6.2 By and large there is no significant difference in the opinion of branch managers, credit/ loan officers at regional! zonal offices and the bank consultants regarding strength of elements, which are normally kept in mind by a banker while sanctioning loan.
Ho-6. 3 By and large there is no significant difference in the opinion of branch managers, credit/loan officers at regional/ zonal offices and the bank consultants regarding effectiveness of various remedies available for reducing NPAs.
Ho-6. 4 By and large there is no significant difference in the views of branch managers, credit/loan officers at regional/ zonal offices and the bank consultants regarding effectiveness of various recovery measures available to reduce NPAs.
Ho-6.5 By and large there is no significant difference in the performance of PSBs regarding volume of Gross NPAs% to Gross Advances in the pre and post reforms period.
Ho-6. 6 By and large there is no significant difference in the performance of PSBs regarding volume of Net NPAs% to Net Advances in the pre and post reforms period.
Ho-6.7 By and large there is no significant difference in the performance of PSBs regarding volume of Gross NPAs as percentage to Total Assets of PSBs in the pre and post reforms period .
Ho-6. 8 By and large there is no significant difference in the performance of PSBs regarding volume of Net NPAs% to Total Assets of PSBs in the pre and post reforms period .
METHODOLOGY
The ultimate object of the study is to evaluate the NPAs managing efficiency of public sector banks with a view to suggest improvements for the management and prevention of growth of NPAs in PSBs. Since the literature available of the topic is very limited so the researcher aimed at establishing linkage between internal efforts of banks and growth of NPAs. In order to make the findings of the study more scientific and accurate the researcher used secondary as well as primary information available of the topic. Credit I Loan officers of Zonal/ Regional office (2 of each PSB)
The respondents were selected on random basis mainly from Branches of PSBs situated in Agra, Mathura, Delhi, Jaipur, Kanpur and Lucknow only by assuming that rest of the country follows the same trend. In addition to this, in order to verify the findings of the study, the researcher took on judgment basis opinion of some academicians having specialization in banking and finance, and the authorities involved in appraisal of project reports submitted by borrowers at the time of sanctioning loans and also in recovery matters.
The primary information is analyzed by using simple statistical techniques like averages, weighted averages and tests of significance (t Test and ANOVA Test).
LIMITATIONS
Taking into consideration the objectives of the study and its coverage both in terms of time span and the number of banks, the study is prone to many limitations.
Some of the major unavoidable limitations of present work are as follows:
• Financial information collected for the present study is mostly secondary in nature. In such a case, the study carries all the limitations inherent with the secondary data and the financial information.
• While computing the data for the purpose of analysis, some adjustment has been made even in the financial information collected.
• Some ratios and percentages have also been approximated .
Therefore, minor variations are bound to exist in the present study.
• The sample was drawn from the PSBs Branches situated in Agra, Mathura, Delhi, Jaipur, Kanpur and Lucknow only by assuming that rest of the country follows the same trend.
